Abstract. This paper focuses on defense mechanisms for cross-site scripting attacks, the top threat on web applications today. It is believed that input validation (or filtering) can effectively prevent XSS attacks on the server side. In this paper, we discuss several recent real-world XSS attacks and analyze the reasons for the failure of filtering mechanisms in defending these attacks. We conclude that while filtering is useful as a first level of defense against XSS attacks, it is ineffective in preventing several instances of attack, especially when user input includes content-rich HTML. We then propose XSS-GUARD, a new framework that is designed to be a prevention mechanism against XSS attacks on the server side. XSS-GUARD works by dynamically learning the set of scripts that a web application intends to create for any HTML request. Our approach also includes a robust mechanism for identifying scripts at the server side and removes any script in the output that is not intended by the web application. We discuss extensive experimental results that demonstrate the resilience of XSS-GUARD in preventing a number of real-world XSS exploits.
Introduction
The growth of JavaScript based client-side programming has given rise to several serious security problems related to web applications. The most notorious problem is cross site scripting (XSS), cited as the topmost threat, accounting for nearly 30% of the reported vulnerabilities in web applications today [6] . Web application worms such as Samy [21] spread through these attacks, affecting millions of users worldwide. More recently, XSS attacks have become vectors for a much broader class of attacks, and researchers suggest that they can be used to create a distributed botnet without the need for user involvement [5] .
The problem of cross-site scripting results from JavaScript code that can be injected into a document through untrusted input. A typical scenario is the following code in a Java web application, that prints the supplied username on its output:
out.println("<P> Hello "+uname+"! Welcome</P>");
Unfortunately, this code is vulnerable to XSS attacks, as the input can contain scripting commands: e.g., <script>...stealCookie()...</script>. When such injected code is executed in the client browser, it can result in stealing cookies, defacing the document or unauthorized submission of forms. We refer to such JavaScript code as unauthorized code, to distinguish it from code that was authorized, i.e., inserted into the HTTP response by the web application without being influenced by untrusted input.
Input validation is the most commonly employed defense against XSS attacks. In the code of the web application, untrusted input is processed by a filtering module that looks for scripting commands or meta-characters in untrusted input, and filters any such content before these inputs get processed by the web application. Filtering can be used to place constraints on input before they are processed by a web application (such as "zip codes contain exactly five characters from the set [0-9]"). From a practical standpoint, employing filters provides a first layer of defense against XSS attacks. However, there are many scenarios where filtering is difficult to get right, especially when dealing with arbitrary user input that could include content-rich HTML. In this case, every character in the HTML character set is legal, which implies that the filter cannot reject any individual character that may result in script content. Therefore, the filter has to identify sequences of characters that may result in script content. Furthermore, the filter has to "guess" how particular character sequences may appear to a browser. For instance, some browsers typically ignore the "/" character and read the string <script/> as a script tag, whereas this view may not be shared by a validation routine seeking to remove script tags.
Other approaches that defend applications against attacks on the server side, such as dynamic tainting, track the use of untrusted information by the application. They further ensure that this untrusted information passes through a filter routine before it is output by the web application. While they correctly track whether a filter routine is called before untrusted information is output, they do not reason about the correctness of employed filters, assuming the filtering is "done right". (Some progress has been made in reasoning about the correctness of filters in recent works [13, 11] , but these works still do not address all the problems discussed in Section 2.)
In this paper, we present the results of a study that involved a large number of recent real-world XSS attacks, and discuss the reasons for the failure of filtering mechanisms used in the applications that were subject to these attacks. We present this study using a generic example of a web application in Section 2.
We then propose a new framework called XSS-GUARD for detecting XSS attacks on the server side. XSS-Guard works by discovering intentions of the web application, and uses this in order to stave attacks. It rests mainly on two simple observations: (a) web applications are written implicitly assuming benign inputs, and encode programmer intentions to achieve a certain HTML response on these inputs, and (b) maliciously crafted inputs subvert the program into straying away from these intentions, leading to a HTML response that leads to XSS-attacks.
Since intentions are implicit, we propose to dynamically elicit these intentions from the web application during every run. In our approach, the main idea for discovering intentions is to generate a shadow response for every (real) HTTP response generated by the web application. The purpose behind generating the shadow response is to elicit the intended set of authorized scripts that correspond to the HTTP response. Whenever an HTTP response is generated by a web application, XSS-GUARD identifies the set of scripts present in the (real) response. The process of identifying scripts in the real response involves robust identification techniques involving real world browser code.
XSS-GUARD then checks whether there is any script in this set that is not authorized (i.e., not intended) by the web application. This is accomplished by using the shadow response, which only contains scripts intended by the application. An unauthorized script is an instance of XSS attack, and XSS-GUARD removes it from the response and then sends the response to the client.
The key benefits of the XSS-GUARD approach are:
-Deployment friendly. Our approach does not require any significant level of human involvement in terms of code changes to be applied for XSS defense. It is based on a fully automated program transformation technique that removes the injected scripts. -Strong resilience. Our approach is highly resilient to some very subtle scenarios that occur in XSS inputs, as illustrated by our comprehensive evaluation. -Acceptable overheads. Our approach does not impose an undue burden on web application performance.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss several real-world examples that challenge conventional filtering, especially in the context of legacy applications. Section 3 starts with the overall design of XSS-GUARD followed by the technical details behind our approach. Section 4 discusses a comprehensive evaluation of XSS-GUARD on several metrics including attack detection, resilience and performance. Section 5 analyzes contemporary XSS defenses and compares them with our approach. In Section 6 we conclude after a general discussion about future directions.
Challenges in preventing XSS attacks
We use an abstract example of a web application to discuss the challenges in preventing XSS attacks. (This example has been modeled based on several real-world attack scenarios.) Fig. 1 depicts an arbitrary run of this application. The application accepts a set of inputs (I 1 , I 2 ,. . ., I n ). Each node in the graph of the application denotes a program location P i where the web application generates HTML. Each output statement contributes to the HTTP response in sequence, which taken together, forms the web page that constitutes the HTTP response. For the sake of brevity, the figure does not depict other nodes in the web application that involve computation (these are abstracted along the edges). Two views of the generated HTML response from each output location P i are shown: one at the server side, based on the program locations where it was output from (on the left), and the view at the browser (on the client). The scripts identified by the browser are shown as S 1 through S 4 .
Filtering The web application in the Fig. 1 also includes filtering routines; the routine F shown after the application reads inputs is an input validation function. In addition, the routines f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m shown in the figure are output sanitization functions; these look for script commands in outputs being generated by each output statement, and possibly sanitize them. In the rest of this section, using several examples, we argue that these routines are not adequate in preventing several well-known types of XSS attacks.
Browser view As noted in the figure, the browser identifies the scripts and executes them. It is important to note that the scripts S 1 through S 4 identified at the browser are precisely those that will be executed when the page is viewed in the browser. The browser cannot distinguish between scripts that were crafted by malicious input or were intended by the web application in the response. Therefore, it simply executes all scripts, and this can result in XSS attacks. The web-application could communicate the set of intended scripts to a specially-equipped browser as suggested in BEEP [17] , but this approach has problems of scalability from the web application's point of view; every client user needs to have a copy of this specialized browser that can understand this non-standard communication.
Output sanitization Note that each of the filter functions f i can HTML-encode all the output characters, so that the corresponding characters can be rendered by the browser. This can prevent all XSS attacks since all the characters will be escaped and interpreted literally by the browser. For instance, the string <script> will be encoded to &lt;script&gt;. However, this will disallow any HTML to be input by the user, and will break web applications such as wikis and blogs as they render user-supplied HTML.
Some XSS attack scenarios
Let us now consider in detail several scenarios outlined in the Fig. 1 . We consider the HTTP response both from the web application's and browser's points of view.
1. Authorized Scripts. The web application may output content that did not depend on user input in any fashion, and a browser identifies the script content in this output. This is the scenario depicted as script S 1 in Fig. 1 . Since this behavior (script execution) was intended by the application, the browser can be allowed to execute S 1 . [21] introduced keywords prohibited by the filters (innerHTML) through JavaScript code that resulted the output at the client end (eval('inner' + 'HTML')). It is hard to isolate and filter input that builds such constructs, without understanding the syntactical context in which they are used.
The above examples illustrates why filtering is hard to get right, especially in the presence of HTML input. Furthermore, an existing exploit can be obfuscated to avoid detection through filtering. Such obfuscation can be achieved by encoding it in various ways -UTF-8, HEX, foreign languages etc. Such encoding can even be provided on-thefly and filters have to cope up with such dynamic scenarios. 1 When such encodings can be set dynamically in the presence of other factors listed above, it is difficult for filtering techniques to identify script content. Static analysis techniques to detect sanitization violations will fail to detect script content that is injected through these encodings.
Summarizing, the salient points from this section are:
1. Filtering is difficult to get right in the presence of user input that includes HTML.
1 A typical instance is web applications that provide response to natural language query requests. Typically these allow the end user to make use of a dynamic parameter to specify the expected character set for the response. For instance, Google search queries take ie and oe parameters that specify the input encoding and output encodings respectively.
(i) Web Application
String uName = request.getParameter("uName"); out.println("<html><body>"); out.println("<script>f()</script>"); out.println("Hi " + uName + "!"); if(uName == "admin") out.print("<script>Admin-script()"); else out.print("<script>Non-Admin-script()"); out.println("</script>"); out.println("</body></html>");
(ii) Benign Access, uName = Alan 1. <html><body> 2. <script>f()</script> 3. Hi Alan! 4. <script>Non-Admin-script()</script> 5. </body></html> (iii) Real Page : uName exploited 1. <html><body> 2. <script>f()</script> 3. Hi <script>evil();</script>! 4. <script>Non-Admin-script()</script> 5. </body></html> Fig. 2 . Example server side application and generated HTML pages 2. The output of a web application must be analyzed in its entirety to identify script content. 3. A robust mechanism to identify script content is needed, as there are a myriad of ways to encode the unauthorized script content that may escape filters but may appear on the client browser.
Furthermore, from a usability and deployment point of view, any proposed solution must allow users to specify harmless (without scripts) HTML and must be easy to deploy. The solution discussed in the next section satisfies all the above requirements.
Our Approach
Objective The objective of our approach is to prevent unauthorized script content from being output on the response from the server side. We want to detect any malicious scriptable content that may go undetected through any input filtering mechanism present in the web application code.
The central theme of the XSS injection attacks is to introduce script code that would perform malicious operations, instead of the operations that were intended by the web application. A web application is written by a programmer implicitly assuming benign inputs, and encode programmer intentions to output a particular web page on these inputs. The presence of an unauthorized script in the output, which will be executed by the browser is an example of a deviation from the web application's intentions.
The key idea in our approach is to learn the intention of the web application while creating the HTTP response page. This is done through shadow pages, which are generated every time a HTTP response page is generated. These pages are similar to the real HTTP responses returned by the web application with mainly one crucial difference: they only retain the (authorized) scripts that were intended by the web application to be included, and do not contain any injected scripts.
Given the real and shadow pages, one can compare the script contents present in the real page with web-application intended contents, present in the shadow page. Any "difference" detected here indicates a deviation from the web application's intentions, and therefore signals an attack.
As a running example, consider the code snippet of a simple web application given in Fig. 2 (i) . This code embeds the user specified name and generates Admin-script / Non-Admin-script based on whether the user is admin. Notice that the parameter Fig. 3 . The XSS-GUARD server side defense approach "uName" is vulnerable to injection and can be exploited by specifying malicious values. Fig. 2 (ii) and (iii) show responses generated for a benign user uName=Alan, and for a malicious user name uName=<script>evil();</script>, respectively.
Conceptually, Fig. 2 (ii) is a shadow page (contains only the intended scripts for a non-admin user -f(), Non-Admin-script()) for the response shown in part (iii). The injected attack at line 3 in part (iii), has no equivalent script at line 3 of the shadow page part(ii), and presents an intuitive example of attack detection in our approach. Fig. 3 depicts the block level architecture of our approach. In the pre-deployment view, a web application is retrofitted (step A) through an automated transformation to facilitate generation of shadow pages and then deployed (step B) in place of the original application. In the post deployment view for any HTTP request received (step 1) by the web application, the instrumented application generates (step 2) a shadow page corresponding to the actual HTTP response (real page). The real and shadow pages are compared (step 3) for equivalence of script contents and any attacks found in the real page are eliminated. The modified HTTP response page is sent (step 4) to the client.
In the following sections, we elaborate the mechanisms used by XSS-GUARD for robust script identification and comparison.
A generic mechanism for identifying script content
We want to identify the set of scripts present in the real page in order to check if they are intended by the web application. In order to do this, we need to first identify the set of all scripts in the real page.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the set of scripts executed at the client are precisely those that have been identified by the browser. A browser has the complete context to decide whether a sequence of HTML entities will invoke a script. Even if the input is based on a specific encoding, browser sees all encoded input "in-the-clear" and therefore can perform sound identification of all script content in a HTML page. In other words, a real browser is a natural candidate for identifying all the scripts present in a web page. Our approach therefore makes use of a real-world browser's code base for precise identification of scripts in a web page. The portion of the browser code base that is of interest to us is the one responsible for tokenizing HTML content and parsing it, and ultimately invoking the JavaScript interpreter on script content. To this end, we analyzed the script content identification schemes employed by one of the popular web browsers -Firefox, and describe our customizations of Firefox components that identify script content. Fig. 4 depicts a high level diagram of the content flow in Firefox with regards to script identification. We ignore any browser component that is not relevant to script identification, and describe the behavior at an abstract level, thus making the discussion applicable to other browsers in general.
Firefox mechanisms to identify script content
The component scanner identifies character boundaries, and the tokenizer aggregates them into lexical tokens. The results of this lexical analysis is given to a content sink, a component responsible for HTML-tag specific browser action. For instance, when the content sink encounters a tag that has a src attribute, it calls the networking components that downloads additional data that is pointed to by the src attribute. Similarly, when a <script> tag is encountered, the content sink calls the JavaScript interpreter.
We then further studied the browser code base to identify when the JavaScript interpreter is called from a content sink. The browser invokes the JavaScript interpreter in three distinctive situations:
Entities causing external resource downloads These are the tags / attributes designated by the HTML specification to embed external resources in HTML pages. Such entities can be used to directly or indirectly introduce script content in the embedding HTML pages. An example is <script src=...>, which directly introduces script contents, whereas <embed src=xss.swf> can indirectly introduce script contents.
Inlined script content and event handlers These tags / attributes are designated by the HTML specification to introduce inlined scripts and event handlers. Examples are <script> which introduces script code, or <body onload=...> where the script code corresponding to onload is executed when this entity is loaded in the browser.
URI Schemes that can have scripts
The above two techniques are based on the HTML specification and thus provide exact knowledge of the tags / attributes utilizing these techniques. However, script content based on URI schemes present other subtle ways of embedding script content in non-obvious contexts. These schemes are the mechanisms by which an HTML entity can direct the browser to perform special pro-cessing. Browsers implement protocol handlers to cater to these special processing requests. An example is an image tag <img src="javascript:script"> that makes use of javascript URI scheme and directs the browser to execute the specified script.
Using a custom content sink to identify script content
An important inference from our study of the Firefox identification mechanisms is that the content sink phase possesses sufficient information to enable identification of all script content. Also, for above purpose, the rest of the components in a typical browser stack are not required. Hence, a code stack from the Firefox browser comprising of the scanner, tokenizer and content sink would result in a much smaller script identifier that is sufficient for our purposes. The XSS-GUARD framework makes use of this lightweight code stack from the Firefox code base to perform precise identification.
We extended the content sink implementation in Firefox to record the identified script content. Our implementation handles all the three kinds of script content discussed above. Overall, our identification of the script content at the content sink component is quite robust. Also, re-using components such as the tokenizer and scanner from an existing browsers' stack provides this scheme immunity against various encoding schemes and browser quirks. Moreover, being a part of actual browser stack, the tokenizer obviates the need for identifying tokens / keywords through error prone algorithms.
Incorporating behaviors of other browsers
Utilizing a single browser's identification mechanisms would not be sufficient to identify script constructs specific to other browsers. This can be remedied by selectively incorporating other browser specific mechanisms. For this purpose, we built a custom content sink based on Firefox browser stack and then extended its identification to encompass behaviors specific to other browsers. For instance, Firefox only checks for 38 event names, but our custom content sink supports an extended list comprising of 94 event names from [4] that are supported by other browsers. More details of our specific extensions are provided in the Section 4.
Shadow Pages : Computing web application intent
A web application is written implicitly assuming benign inputs (with filtering to remove malicious input). It encodes programmer intentions to output a particular web page on these inputs. The XSS-GUARD approach is to capture these intentions using shadow pages.
Naturally, the shadow page will differ according to the input provided to the web application; a shadow page is therefore defined for a particular run of the web application. Formally, a shadow page of a web application P on any input u is the output response of the web application on some benign input v, on which P traverses the same path as it traverses on u.
Finding such benign inputs v, in general, is undecidable. We avoid this problem by using some manifestly benign inputs (such as a string of a's), and force the web application to act on these benign inputs along the same control path dictated by these real inputs. This technique has been used to successfully defend SQL injection attacks in our previous work [8] .
(i) Transformed Web Application : real shadow page String uName = request.getParameter("uName"); String uName_c = benginCandidate(uName); StringBuffer re = ""; // real response StringBuffer sh = ""; // shadow response re.append("<html><body>"); sh.append("<html><body>"); re.append("<script>f()</script>"); sh.append("<script>f()</script>"); re.append("Hi " + uName + "!\n"); sh.append("Hi " + uName_c + "!\n"); if(uName == "admin"){ re.append("<script>Admin-script()"); sh.append("<script>Admin-script()"); } else{ re.append("<script>Non-Admin-script()"); sh.append("<script>Non-Admin-script()"); } re.append("</script>\n"); sh.append("</script>\n"); re.append("</body></html>"); sh.append("</body></html>"); re = XSS-PREVENT(re, sh); out.print(re); More specifically, in order to construct the shadow page, we use explicitly benign user inputs; those that do not contain any meta characters of the scripting language. As these inputs are manifestly benign and do not contain any script content, the corresponding web application output will be free of injected script content, while retaining content authorized by the web application. Hence, an HTTP request with explicitly benign inputs will result in an exploit free HTML response from the web application.
We automatically transform the original web application to generate the shadow response pages apart from the real response pages. We refer the readers to our previous work [8] for a comprehensive treatment of this program transformation, and provide the key ideas here to make the discussion self-contained.
-For every string variable v in the program, we add a variable v c that denotes its shadow. When v is initialized from the user input, v c is initialized with an explicitly benign value of the same length as v. If v is initialized by the program, v c is also initialized with the same value. -For every program instruction on v, our transformed program performs the same operation on the shadow variable v c . Departure from these mirrored operations comes in handling conditionals, where the shadow computation needs to be forced along the path dictated by the real inputs. Therefore, the logic for path-selection in the program is not transformed and acts on the real inputs. -Each output generating statement (writing output to the client), is replaced by appending the arguments to a buffer. This is done both for the real and the shadow values. -After the last write operation, transformation adds invocation to a method responsible for detecting and disabling the XSS attacks.
The transformed web application for the running example is shown in the Fig. 5 . It also shows real and shadow pages generated by this transformed application. The real and the shadow pages are stored in variables re and sh respectively and follow the transformation outlined previously. On line 23 in the transformed application real and shadow pages are passed on to a routine XSS-PREVENT that identifies and removes all the injected attacks and returns a retrofitted page, which is then returned to the client.
The generated shadow pages possess the following properties:
-The set of scripts in the shadow page is precisely that intended for the control path dictated by the real inputs. This is by virtue of a transformation that "mirrors" the computation on manifestly benign values on the same control path dictated by the real inputs. More specifically, when the user input is admin, the shadow page will contain the scripts f and Admin-script (and only those), and for a non-admin user, the shadow page will only contain the scripts f and Non-Admin-script. -The transformation maintains the length of the shadow page to be the same as the real page. This is true as long as the functions defined in the web application are length preserving [8] , a criterion satisfied by all the functions in the Java Standard library string manipulation suite. As a result the shadow and real pages are of the same length. Moreover, the offsets of the script content in the real and shadow pages are the same e.g., Non-Admin-script start and end offsets are same in both the real and the shadow pages.
Distinguishing XSS attack instances from authorized scripts
Equipped with the knowledge of script content in the real page and corresponding intended script content in the shadow page, our approach asks the following two questions about each script content identified in the real page:
1. Web application intent mining. For each identified script content, did the web application intend to create it? 2. Script checking. If so, are the actual script content "equivalent" to the application intended script content?
To see consider our example Fig. 5 (iv) (attack), on reaching line 3, the script identifier described in the previous section will reach a state that will identify the content as script. Whereas, in corresponding shadow page Fig. 5 (v) line 3, the parser will not identify any script content. If the identified script content and the web application intended content are not "equivalent", it is an XSS attack instance. We elaborate on the notion of equivalence below.
All identified script content (including attacks) originate from one of the following three categories of web application action:
1. Created without untrusted inputs -script content that are created without any influence of the untrusted inputs, and hence are benign. The script created on line 2 of Fig. 5 (ii), provides an example of such content creation. Interestingly, corresponding shadow page also contains the exact same script at the same offsets as the real page, and a direct content comparison suffices to establish their equivalence.
Benign case XSS attack User Input uName = John uName = ";evil();c=" Real Script Content var name = "John"; var name = ""; evil(); c = ""; Shadow Script Content var name = "aaaa"; var name = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"; Fig. 6 . Syntactically different content are generated with benign and hostile user inputs 2. Created by embedding untrusted inputs -script content that embed untrusted inputs, and depending on the user inputs may be benign or hostile. The code snippet presented in Fig. 6 uses the untrusted data to initialize a variable in the script. Looking at the corresponding shadow script confirms that unlike the previous case, directly comparing the content does not work here. Although we cannot check equivalence of last two cases mentioned above by directly comparing the content, both these cases share a well researched insight about injection attacks -a successful injection attack changes the syntactical structure of the exploited entity [18] . In case 3 above, an adversary injects script content in a context where it is not expected. Whereas, in case 2, the main goal of an attacker is to perform semantically different operations through the use of malicious input. Hence the syntactical structure of the real script generated with hostile user inputs, would be different, when compared to corresponding shadow script.
Based on the above discussion, we compare the (JavaScript) syntax structure of script elements, in absence of an exact match in the content.
JavaScript parse tree comparison details
To establish syntactical structure equivalence, we compare the JavaScript parse tree structures of the real and shadow scripts. However, a straightforward comparison of parse trees would cause false negatives e.g., parse trees for a = b; and c = d; are same. We compare the parse trees such that their structures are same along with an exact match of lexical entities -including the JavaScript comments, variable names and operators, and function names. String literals are not compared literally; in this case, we check if they have same lexical token value. An exception to this rule for string literals arises when strings are used as arguments to functions such as document.write, when we demand exact equality, as demands a match in lexical token values will allow an attack to succeed.
Filtering out hostile script content Any identified script content that fails the equivalence check (exact content match or parse tree comparison), is marked as an XSS attack instance. As we precisely know the offsets of the script content in the real page, such non-conforming content is replaced with explicitly benign values. The script content evil(); found in the real page of Fig. 5 (iv) fails to match due to the parse tree comparison. As a result, evil(); is identified as an XSS attack and is replaced with the shadow counterpart aaaaaaa.
Conditional Copying Procedures
There are a few instances where our approach fails and requires user involvement. Consider the following code from a routine that simply copies a character x to y using the following code: if x='a' then y='a' else if x='b' then y='b' else if ...
We can extend the above routine to copy a string x to a string y, iterating through each character in the input by matching the correct conditional. Let us call this a conditional-copy function. If the web application has such a function, then our candidate evaluation technique will copy a user-input string <script> to the shadow page, while completely ignoring its candidate value (of a string of a's). This is one example of a case our approach fails to protect filtering, and is in fact an example where every known server-side technique against XSS defense will fail, including dynamic tainting.
The above example is simple but contrived, however there are practical examples of such "table-lookup" code. One instance we encountered is charset-decoding, where every character in a particular character set is decoded using a similar table lookup. Here too, our approach and dynamic tainting will fail. In case of our approach and tainting, the information about untrusted input is lost due to the conditional-copy of one character to another. Our solution for handling these functions is to include (user supplied) summarization functions, that summarize the effect of these functions and preserve the shadow values. For instance, the copy function given above has a summarization function that will simply return the candidate string instead of the real string as its return value.
Implementation Our web application transformation is for Java / JSP applications. The program transformation to enable the shadow page generation, is implemented in Java SOOT optimization framework [2] . For the script content identification module, we implemented a custom content sink phase that used scanner and tokenizer from the Firefox browser. The HTML tokenizer / scanner modules are modified to generate the offsets for identified content. For the equivalence check, we leveraged the Firefox SpiderMonkey engine's parse tree creation for JavaScripts. We added support to create a flat string representation of these parse trees for comparison purposes.
Experimental Evaluation
Experimental Setup Our experimental setup for evaluating attacks consisted of a server (1GB RAM, 1.66 GHz dual core processor) and a client (2GB RAM, 2.0 GHz dual core processor) both running Ubuntu OS and connected over the same Ethernet network. We deployed the original and XSS-GUARD protected applications under separate but identically configured Apache Tomcat servers.
Effectiveness Evaluation
One of our objectives was to evaluate the effectiveness of the XSS-GUARD approach against the real-world attacks. Since our framework is targeted towards Java applications, we analyzed the CVE repository [20] and chose the JSP / Java based applications that had reported vulnerabilities in 2007. In all, we chose seven such applications: JSPWiki, Tomcat HTML Manager, Tomcat Host Manager and Tomcat example web applications (Cookie, SendMail, Calendar and Snoop). These applications were diverse in sizes and complexity -ranging from a large and complex Wiki engine to small and simple example web applications. Below, we discuss the nature of these exploits and our experience in evaluating the XSS-GUARD approach against them.
JSPWiki (CVE-2007-5120, CVE-2007-5121)
The JSPWiki engine facilitates a collective privilege management by creating groups of users. Unfortunately, the group creation process is vulnerable to XSS attacks. On presenting malformed group names, such as those containing characters that are forbidden by the filter in JSPWiki e.g., <, >, JSPWiki responds with an error message which embeds the malformed group name verbatim, thus making way for XSS exploits.
Tomcat HTML Manager (CVE-2007-2450, CVE-2007-3386)
For deploying new web applications, Tomcat has a built-in application called Manager that accepts a WAR (Web Archive) file name from the user. In this vulnerability, an error message is shown with the user specified WAR file name if it does not end with a .war extension. The following code snippet provides a sample exploit code<form action="http://server/manager/html/upload" method="post"> <input TYPE="hidden" NAME='deployWar"; filename="<script>alert(&#39&#120&#115&#115&#39)</script>" exploit code based on: http://www.securityfocus.com
This exploit circumvents an input restriction (quotes disallowed), by partially encoding the exploit -alert('xss') as alert(&#39&#120&#115&#115&#39). Our approach is resilient to alternate encodings as the HTML parser used for content identification receives all data after being decoded. -2007-(3383, 3384, 2449, 7196) ) In all the previous cases, vulnerable applications display user inputs in their HTTP responses. The SendMail web application is different. It accepts the message subject, recipient and email body from the user and sends an email to the recipient. This application does not display the user data in any HTTP response. However, when from field contains a malicious email address, an external class javax.mail.internet.AddressException raises an exception, which generates a stack trace. The SendMail subsequently displays this stack trace, which contains the malicious from field. Such exceptional cases are typi-cally not checked by the input filters, and illustrates the need for dynamic protection mechanisms such as ours.
Tomcat Web Applications (CVE
Attack evaluation summary Our solution successfully defended all 8 exploits mentioned above. This demonstrates that the XSS-GUARD can be used successfully to safeguard the real world applications against XSS exploits.
A comprehensive evaluation of resilience
To evaluate the resilience of XSS-GUARD we selected RSnake CheatSheet [4] , a collection of 92 unique exploits based on different attack vectors to evade the server side filters. Many of these exploits are quite subtle, and explore a significant portion of the attack surface. In our evaluation, we focused on 36 out of the 92 RSnake cheat sheet exploits that are applicable to the Firefox. Out of 92, four exploits were not applicable -SSI, PHP, one does not introduce scripts and one exploit could not be reproduced. We evaluated the remainder of 32 exploits in our experiments. These exploits are classified into various categories, for brevity we only mention a few interesting cases here below.
XSS exploits based on Firefox quirks
Exploits based on this vector rely on the "adhoc(quirk)" behavior of the Firefox HTML parser e.g., only the Firefox executes -<SCRIPT/XSS SRC="http://evil/e.js"></SCRIPT>. Note that the filters oblivious to this quirk will miss out such attacks. As our approach uses the Firefox HTML parser, we were able to identify these tags without any special handling.
XSS Vector embedded in the Flash object
This vector embeds the exploit in the ActionScript of a Flash object, which invokes client side JavaScript interpreter when rendered. When this exploit requires exploit code to embed the flash object, our approach disallows it. However, if the exploit is embedded in a Flash object included by the web application, our technique cannot prevent it.
XSS exploit vector based on a pre-existing execution environment This vector is useful in situations where user input is added to a existing execution environment e.g., between <script> and </script> tags. This poses additional difficulties for filters. In our case such attempts are prevented by script parse tree comparison as such vectors cause the JavaScript parse tree structures to vary.
XSS exploit vector based on self generating scripts
In this interesting vector the prohibited keywords or constructs may not even appear in the exploits at the server side, but dynamically generated at the client. Variations of this scheme were used in the MySpace Samy worm which constructed the prohibited keyword innerHTML on the client side by using "eval('inne' + 'rHTML')". However, such attacks require script code and are disallowed by XSS-GUARD.
Summary
We used vulnerable JSPWiki application from CVE to recreate all the 32 applicable exploits of the cheat sheet. We then tested these exploits on the XSS-GUARD protected JSPWiki application, which was able to defend all. The successful defense of several subtle attacks demonstrates that the XSS-GUARD approach is highly resilient.
Performance
We conducted another set of experiments to evaluate acceptability of our solution in terms of performance overheads. We measured the browser end response times using benchmarking tool JMeter [7] for the original and the XSS-GUARD protected applications.
The performance overheads ranged from 5% to 24%. The least overhead resulted for the SendMail application (response page 266B, 2 scriptable attributes). The Tomcat HTML Manager application incurred the highest overhead in terms of the response time (response page 12.75KB, 67 scriptable entities).
To assess the scalability of our approach to safeguard widely accessed websites, we analyzed one level GET page responses (without downloading embedded resources) of the ten most accessed websites in the United States [1] . The largest page response was 75KB (www.youtube.com), four were in the range of 32-50KB and rest all were less than 12KB. Based on this data we created a web application that generated response pages of different sizes (1KB to 75KB). We then transformed this web application with XSS-GUARD and measured the response times for original and guarded application for varying response sizes. Overheads incurred were reasonably moderate (2.8% -13.64%).
To evaluate the impact of JavaScript parse tree comparisons on the performance, we enabled above application to also generate varying number of scripts with embedded user inputs. For 1-5 scripts in a 20KB response page, overheads varied in the range of 37%-42%. As mentioned earlier, the JavaScript parse tree comparison is needed only rarely (in presence of attacks or scripts that embed user inputs). We did not encounter any such case while measuring the performance of the applications from the CVE.
This extensive performance analysis demonstrates that this approach has acceptable overheads in real world situations. These numbers are indicative of the worst case performance of our approach. In our experiments client and server were connected over the same Ethernet and hence the impact of network latency, that dominates response time, is negligible. We believe that the overheads in a real world deployment of our solution would be significantly less than the reported numbers here.
Verifying safe-passage of benign HTML tags in untrusted contents
Web applications such as Wikis and Blogs allow end user to input HTML. This is highly desirable as it allows users to format their input data using HTML tags. We also wanted to study the possibility of our solution working smoothly with applications that allow selective HTML input.
To understand the degree of freedom granted to the users in specifying HTML, we analyzed several Wiki / blog applications (Pebble, Drupal, Plone, Geeklog, JSPWiki, JChatBox) 2 that allow a limited set of HTML entities to pass through. We also analyzed the HTML specification 4.01 and identified following entities to be allowable -text, lists, tables, links, alignment, font styles, and horizontal rules. We compiled these into a comprehensive test suite consisting of benign tags and attributes.
Equipped with above test suite, we decided to assess any loss of functionality of the XSS-GUARD protected applications in the presence and absence of the selective HTML filters.
XSS-GUARD in the presence of HTML filters For co-existence evaluation we chose the selective HTML filtering mechanisms employed by the following two applications: -Pebble: filters allow limited / no HTML, and strip the <script> tags.
-JChatBox: filters forbid all HTML, and encode the URLs with <a> tags.
We modified the Tomcat Calendar application to process the user inputs with above filters and then transformed it using XSS-GUARD. For JChatBox filter, XSS-GUARD allowed the filter created <a> tags and all the escaped HTML to pass through and echoed the same behavior for Pebble filters. However, the script filter allowed the XSS attacks to pass through e.g., <script>nada</script><script src=URL> resulted in <script src=URL>. This attack, however, was caught by the XSS-GUARD and removed from the response page.
In absence of filters, we used the XSS-GUARD protected Tomcat calendar application and verified that all the entities listed in our testbed were allowed in user inputs. These experiments demonstrate usefulness of layering XSS-GUARD protection on top of the existing filtering mechanisms. The XSS-GUARD protected applications do not forbid benign HTML allowed by selective filtering mechanisms, but are able to prevent any attacks missed by the filters. We also notes that XSS-GUARD allows a rich set of benign HTML thus allowing users to input content rich HTML input.
Discussion
As the script identification in the current implementation of the XSS-GUARD is based on components from the Firefox browser family, it does not identify all script contents based on 'quirks' specific to other browsers (say Internet Explorer). We tested our current implementation against 56 exploits from XSS cheatsheet that were based on quirks specific to non-Firefox browsers; XSS-GUARD defended 35 out of these 56 exploits. However, to uniformly identify scripts across the browser families a "universal" parser is required. -To build a browser independent URI scheme identification, the custom content sink could unify identification of schemes implemented in different browsers. -The custom content sink could be modified to identify and parse URI schemes specific to other browsers e.g., <img src="vbscript:xss">. -If the quirk is based on the tokenization process specific to a browser family, universal parser could handle it by incorporating necessary changes in it's tokenization process.
Attacks specific to other browsers XSS-GUARD may produce a different output page when an attack specific to a browser is attempted. For instance, <img src=javascript:xss> is an XSS vector for Internet Explorer (IE), but is not a valid attack vector for Firefox, which simply ignores the javascript src attribute for image URLs. Disabling this exploit code does not impact Firefox user agents, as XSS-GUARD results in an output page with a broken image link, when viewed in Firefox. However, if the client user agent is IE, then XSS-GUARD protects the browser from any attacks through XSS vector.
False Negatives
We also found XSS-GUARD to produce false negatives in cases when attacks utilized non-Firefox quirks that were not identified by the custom content sink. One typical missed attack instance was based on IE conditional comments. However, as mentioned before, such attacks can be prevented by appropriately modifying the content sink.
Related work
Research on cross-site scripting can be broadly classified into approaches that (a) detect vulnerabilities (b) prevent attacks against applications. Our contribution in this paper falls into the second category.
Vulnerability analysis based approaches
There are several approaches that rely on static analysis techniques [19, 22, 14] to detect programs vulnerable to XSS injection attacks. As mentioned in the introduction, these tools are typically intended to be used by a developer during the code development process. These techniques are limited to identifying sources (points of input) and sinks (query issuing locations), and checking whether every flow from a source to the sink is subject to input validation ( [19] is flow-insensitive while [22] is flow-sensitive, and [14] adds more support for aliasing). However, these tools do not themselves check the correctness of input validation functions.
Recently, [13] and [11] proposed solutions to the important question of checking filter functions. In [13] the code of a filter function is abstracted into a context-free grammar, and the XSS exploits are modeled as a regular expression and detection is done by checking whether the intersection of these two languages is non-empty. Since their modeling is based on static string analysis, it does not work for arbitrary custom filtering code based on dynamic string operations. Balzarotti et al. [11] check sanitization code between input locations (sources) and output locations (sinks) through static analysis, and construct exploits through dynamic analysis. Both these approaches use some form of "blacklist" for checking whether scripting commands contained in this blacklist appear in the output of sanitization functions. Based on our discussion in Section 2, putting together this blacklist will require identifying every possible string sequence that would result in a scripting command in a browser, while excluding all valid HTML. This is certainly a challenging task. We avoid the need for a blacklist, by using a real-world browser and the actual output of an application, thus achieving precise script detection and XSS prevention.
All the previous static approaches do not track vulnerabilities across web application modules, and typically lose precision. [10] refer to these vulnerabilities as multimodule vulnerabilities and develop an approach called MiMosa. It models an application's extended state to identify vulnerabilities that traverse modules. Extended state based attacks pose no problem for our approach. Data carried through session variables have their candidate (shadow) counterparts which denote corresponding benign input, and can be used to prevent attacks.
Attack prevention approaches
Server side detection approaches [9, 16, 18, 23] track the user specified inputs through mechanisms like taint tracking. In particular, [16] and [18] briefly suggest in their discussion that placing syntactical restrictions on tainted data may lead to precise XSS attack detection. Restricting the tainted data to specific syntactical contexts is a powerful idea. Our approach makes use of dynamic candidate evaluation, a real world HTML parser and a JavaScript engine to obtain the contextual information and place such syntactic restrictions on output of a web application. Thus our approach demonstrates a realization of this idea in a practical setting for detecting XSS attacks.
Commercial solutions These are many web applications (KaVaDo InterDo, NetContinuum NC-1000 Web Security Gateway, Sanctum AppShield, and others that can be referenced from [3] ) that perform filtering at a proxy level to detect injection attacks. Since these apply a set of (application independent) filters, these are subject to the same limitations that were discussed in Section 2.
Client side protection Client side approaches [12, 15] try to protect sensitive information leakage by preventing attempts to send the sensitive data to third party servers. These schemes treat symptoms of an XSS attack (such as a cookie stealing script). Therefore, these schemes do not prevent XSS attacks that violate the same-origin policy e.g., attacker injected scripts can update user information on the trusted server, or perform malicious transactions within the same domain. However, such schemes have the advantage of empowering end users by being readily deployable on the clients without relying on the server side to provide the protection.
Browser-Web application collaboration [17] propose a solution that requires web applications and browsers to collaborate. Web application provides policies (a while list of all benign scripts), which when enforced by the browsers (only white-listed scripts execute), ensures protection against injection attacks. This is a very sound idea. However current framework requires web applications and browsers to collaborate -which may be a big challenge in adoption of such solutions. Further, in [17] , white-list construction is mostly done by hand, and does not automatically include dynamically generated scripts. Our scheme can be complimentary to the solution provided by [17] to determine the set of scripts in the whitelist.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel and precise defense against XSS attacks. As a standalone mechanism or with widely used schemes like filtering, our approach can provide a robust defense against XSS attacks. We provided extensive experimental results that corroborate effectiveness, scalability and applicability of our solution to real world applications and subtle attacks. We also highlighted limitations in our current implementation (some non-Firefox quirks), and presented our thoughts on developing a technique for browser independent script identification.
Overall, we believe that the approach presented in this paper has underscored the promising idea of building solutions based on web application's output and actual script identification behaviors of the browsers to counter the serious threats raised by crosssite scripting attacks.
